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1. Introduction
The public good nature of innovation and R&D investments has attracted economists
attention over several decades, and has received particular emphasis in the new growth
theory. The fact that R&D activities generate products that are at least partially non-
excludable and non-rivalrous was forcefully pointed out by Arrow (1962) and is a key
ingredient in the seminal Romer (1990) model. According to economic theory, there are
many di¤erent options available to deal with market failure due to externalities such
as tax credits, subsidies, extending property rights and public production. All these
policy instruments have been actively used to promote innovation and R&D activities
by most OECD governments, but both the level and the optimal mix of instruments
remain an open question.
While there is a growing literature with empirical studies of the working of R&D tax
credits, less is known about the empirical performance of other policy instruments in the
context of R&D investments.1 Our study focuses on R&D subsidies targeted at specic
projects, and in particular on their impact on privately funded R&D investments.
Using a panel data set for high-tech rms, we examine the investment in R&D for
rms receiving direct R&D grants from di¤erent public sources.2 Our main question is
whether public R&D subsidies result in a net increase or decrease in R&D expenditure,
that is; do government funds substitute for or complement private R&D expenditures?
Our results suggest that R&D subsidies in the industries we study have been successfully
targeted at rms that have expanded their R&D investments, and we conclude that
there is little tendency to crowding out. On the other hand, there does not seem to
be any signicant degree of additionalityassociated with the subsidies either, even
though the government requires that rms contribute 50% own risk capital to subsidized
projects. This own risk capital seems to be taken from ordinary R&D budgets.
We also pursue the issue of dynamic or longer-run e¤ects of R&D subsidies on
R&D investments. Our empirical investigation suggests that such e¤ects are positive,
while conventional models of R&D-investments predict negative dynamic e¤ects. We
present a theoretical analysis of this question, where we argue that learning-by-doing
e¤ects in R&D may explain our empirical results. Such learning e¤ects will generate
positive feedback loops where temporary R&D subsidies increase the protability of
future R&D investments. We present estimates for a structural econometric model of
R&D investment incorporating learning e¤ects in line with the theoretical model.
Mowerys (1995) survey of the practice of technology policy points out that most
OECD countries have grants and subsidy schemes for R&D where government funds
1The literature on the response of R&D investments to tax credits has been surveyed by Gri¢ th,
Sandler and Van Reenen (1995), Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and Ientile and Mairesse (2009).
2 In 2002, the Research Council of Norway introduced an R&D tax credit scheme in addition to direct
R&D grants. The data used in the present study do not extend into this period. The relationship
between the R&D tax credit and other innovation policy instruments is analyzed in Hægeland and
Møen (2007).
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are aimed at complementing and stimulating private R&D investments targeted at
innovations with civilian industrial applications3. Such schemes have gained popularity
among governments in the US and Europe in recent years. One such subsidy scheme
has been investigated by Irwin and Klenow (1996), in a study where they consider the
US governments e¤ort to promote US semiconductor producers in the late 1980s and
the 1990s through subsidies to the R&D consortium called Sematech. They found that
Sematech induced members to cut their overall R&D spending which they interpreted
to be the result of the rms eliminating excessive duplication of research. Earlier
and broader studies of US. rms by Scott (1984) and Lichtenberg (1984, 1987), and
of German rms by Keck (1993), have reached di¤erent conclusions. Scott (1984)
concluded that federally funded R&D in private rms tends to stimulate the rms
own R&D expenditure, while Lichtenberg (1984) found no such tendency when he
controlled for problems with selection bias embedded in Scotts estimate of the e¤ect of
federally funded R&D. Keck (1993) also argued that recipients of public R&D grants
did not increase their overall R&D activities, suggesting that public funds substituted
for private nancing in the German rms he studied4. It is not too surprising that
the e¤ects di¤er across these various studies, since the public R&D schemes di¤er
considerably in their aims. E.g. most of the federal funds studied by Scott (1984)
and Lichtenberg (1984, 1987) are military contracts, while the Sematech program was
aimed at industrial development based on co-operative research. See David, Hall and
Toole (2000), Ja¤e (2002) and García-Quevedo (2004) for surveys of this literature.
2. An analytical treatment of matching grantsR&D subsidies
A common feature of Norwegian R&D grant programs is the requirement that com-
panies receiving subsidies must co-nance the supported projects. Matching grants
have been the most common criteria, but sometimes the own risk has been more than
50% and sometimes less. Despite the formality about own risk capital it is obviously
possible that subsidies in reality crowd out private investments, or at least that some
of the private investments spent on subsidized projects would be invested in R&D even
without subsidies. To aid the discussion, and to prepare a model of matching grants
R&D-subsidies, let
R = RPP +RPG +RG (2.1)
where R is total R&D investments, RG is the R&D-subsidy received from the govern-
ment, RPG is the part of the subsidized R&D projects which a rm has to nance
itself, i.e. the own risk capital, and RPP is the R&D investments which the rm un-
dertakes in non-subsidized projects. Let total R&D investments nanced by the rm
be RP = RPP +RPG: Matching grants imply that RPG = RG:
3See also OECD (1996), especially pp. 111-113.
4See Vickery (1987) and Ergas (1987) for opposing views.
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The full e¤ect of a subsidy on the rmsR&D investments is given by
dR
dRG
=
@RPP
@RG
+
@RPP
@RPG
 @R
PG
@RG
+
@RPG
@RG
+
@RPG
@RPP
 @R
PP
@RG
+ 1
=

2 +
@RPP
@RPG

(2.2)
since by the denition of a matching grant regime @R
PG
@RG
= 1 and @R
PP
@RG
= 0 can be
assumed without loss of generality5.
Two properties of the regime are critical to the rmsinvestment decision. First,
asymmetric information between private rms and the governmental agencies allocating
the grants will a¤ect to what extent it is possible for rms to nance the own risk capital
using ordinary R&D budgets. Second, we do not know whether subsidized rms receive
subsidies at the margin.
Figure 1 illustrates in a simplistic way the rmsdemand for R&D. The dashed
rectangle with base abc represents a subsidized R&D-project. w is the unit cost of
R&D in the market, e.g. the hourly wage of a researcher, and R is the level of R&D
that the rm will choose if it does not receive a subsidy. If the governmental agency
is perfectly informed about R; it will only subsidize R&D projects to the right of this
level. This is the case we dene as full additionality, implying @R
PP
@RPG
= 0 , dR
dRG
= 2:
The government then induces rms to increase their total R&D by two dollars when
giving them a subsidy of one dollar because of the own risk capital requirement.
Consider now a situation where the governmental agency is not perfectly informed
about the rmsR; the optimal level of R&D investments without subsidies. The rms
then want to move as much as possible of their subsidized projects to the left of R in
order to increase the private returns to the projects.6 If the rms succeed in moving the
projects entirely to the left of R, there is full crowding out and @R
PP
@RPG
=  2, dR
dRG
= 0.
Subsidies are then pure transfers, and the government does not achieves anything at
all. If, on the other hand, there is some, but not full, crowding out, @R
PP
@RPG
2 h 2; 1i ,
dR
dRG
2 h0; 1i. One dollar spent on R&D subsidies will increase total R&D investments,
but by less than a dollar since the rms reduce their privately nanced R&D after
receiving the subsidies. If there is neither crowding out, nor additionality, @R
PP
@RPG
=
 1, dR
dRG
= 1: In this case a governmental R&D subsidy does not inuence the rms
privately nanced R&D, and the subsidies will therefore increase total R&D investments
dollar by dollar. With some, but not full, additionality, @R
PP
@RPG
2 h 1; 0i , dR
dRG
2 h1; 2i :
5As RPGt = R
G
t ; considering
@RPPt
@RGt
= 0 simply means that the total e¤ect of the subsidies is measured
by the term @R
PP
t
@RPGt
:
6 In the following we disregard the possibility that the governmental agency responds to its uncertain
information about R by being conservativein its grant allocation policy, so that rms may want to
move their subsidized projects rightwards in Figure 1 in order to increase the probability of having the
projects accepted. For the purpose of this analysis, such a situation can be considered equivalent to
the case with perfect information, as there will be full additionality. The two cases will, however, not
be equivalent with respect to the commercial value of the R&D undertaken.
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One dollar spent on R&D subsidies then increases the rmsprivately nanced R&D,
but not with as much as a dollar. Total R&D investments will therefore increase by
less than two dollars.
In order to discuss whether the rms are free to decide the size of the subsidized
projects, i.e. whether they are subsidized at the margin, we need to distinguish between
the unit cost of R&D in the market, and the rmsmarginal cost of R&D. Let therefore
w0 denote the rmsmarginal cost. If there is full additionality, and rms are allowed
to decide the size of the subsidized projects, their marginal cost is w0 = 12w, and they
will expand their R&D investments until R = R in Figure 1. If there is less than full
additionality and the rms are allowed to decide the size of the subsidized projects,
their marginal cost of R&D is
w0 = w

dRP
dR

= w
 
dRP
dRG
1 + dR
P
dRG
!
= w

1 + 
(2.3)
where we have renamed dR
P
dRG
= ; and  2 [0; 1] : With full additionality  = 1. Note
that as  ! 0; the marginal cost of R&D according to the formula above approaches
zero. The intuition behind this is that rms can expand their R&D activities at a very
low cost if they are allowed to decide the size of subsidized projects where most of the
own risk part is privately protable, i.e. to the left of R: However, the governmental
agency is bound to become suspicious if rms apply for subsidized projects which are
large relative to their total R&D activities. This indicates that it is unlikely that
rms are subsidized at the margin unless there is a signicant degree of additionality
associated with the subsidies. If the rms are constrained with respect to the size of
the subsidized projects, their marginal cost of R&D is w0 = w.
3. The e¤ect of high-tech R&D subsidies on R&D investments: A rst
look
3.1. Questionnaire studies
To what extent subsidies actually stimulate R&D has been an important issue when
technology programs have been evaluated. Table 2 summarizes questionnaire studies
undertaken on this account. Looking at the pooled results at the rightmost column,
about 18 percent of the supported projects would have been undertaken in full with-
out subsidies, while the subsidy was not completely crowded out in 82 percent of the
projects. Furthermore, according to the evaluation reports, 34 percent of the projects
had full additionality. Hence, these questionnaire studies suggest that R&D subsidies
as implemented by the public agencies in Norway exert a positive inuence on the R&D
investments in private rms. It also seems that the degree of crowding out has been
decreasing over time. This trend could indicate a learning process in the public agen-
cies implementing the subsidy schemes, but it could as well indicate that rms have
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become less honest when they respond to the questionnaires. One would in any case
suspect that these verbal reports are biased towards not admitting crowding out, as
this would reduce the likelihood of similar programs being launched in the future. A
more analytic approach is therefore desirable.
3.2. The e¤ect of changes in the level of subsidies on deviation from planned
R&D
One way to shed light on the e¤ect of subsidies, is to examine the correlation between
changes in the level of subsidies and the deviation from planned R&D. Such an analysis
is possible because the rms in the R&D surveys have been asked about their R&D
investment plans both one and two years after the year of the survey. From 1982 until
1989 the investment plans were given in terms of man-years while from 1989 until 1995
they were given in nominal terms. Unfortunately, the R&D surveys were conducted
annually only in the rst four years of the time period examined, and the correlation
between the change in R&D subsidy and the deviation between planned and performed
R&D within a one-year horizon can therefore not be calculated after 1985. From the
rst row in Table 3 we see that the one-year horizon correlation coe¢ cient based on
the available years is essentially zero. This lack of correlation most likely indicates that
rms know the level of subsidies they will receive one year in advance and hence that
they have already included the response to the expected subsidies in their investment
plans7
The two-year horizon results are given in Table 3, rows two and three, based on
R&D measures in man-years and nominal terms respectively. The coe¢ cients strongly
indicate that the correlation between an increase or decrease in subsidies and a devia-
tion from planned R&D, is positive and signicant. Our interpretation of this is that
an increase in subsidies induces the companies to undertake more research than they
otherwise would have done8. Note, however, that this does not give us any information
about the strength of the e¤ect. All that can be concluded is that there is not complete
crowding out. To determine whether there is some degree of crowding out, some or
full additionality, or maybe even more than full additionality, we need to frame the
question within a regression analysis.
7The rms apply about a year in advance, and the data for year t are collected early in year t+ 1;
i.e. year t+1 has started when the rms give their expectations for that year. Many of the applications
for grants have probably been answered at that time.
8An alternative interpretation is that those who came across a good research project after they gave
the survey information both changed their plans and received subsidies. We do, however, believe that
the time span involved is somewhat too short for this to be a plausible explanation. Within less than
two years the rms would have to come up with the idea, le a detailed application for R&D support,
have the application accepted and start the R&D project.
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3.3. Crowding out or additionality: Regression analyses
In this section we regress the rms R&D investments on received R&D subsidies,
controlling for other factors determining R&D investments. We draw on Swenson (1992)
who summarizes the theoretical R&D investment literature into three main hypotheses
about what a¤ects the level of R&D investments in private rms. First, expected sales
might be important if the development costs of new products or processes are xed.
Second, technological opportunity may vary across industries and time. This will in
turn a¤ect the returns to R&D and hence the incentive to invest. Third, the degree
of appropriability is important. If it is di¢ cult to protect innovations from leaking
out to competitors, less prot may be made, and the incentive to innovate is reduced
accordingly.
In empirical studies, expected sales are often proxied by current sales. We have also
included the square of sales to account for possible non-linearities in size. Technological
opportunity and degree of appropriability can to some extent be handled by including
industry and time dummies. Industry dummies are, however, not su¢ cient to account
for the large heterogeneity in R&D investments found in microdata. Furthermore, as
argued by Lichtenberg (1984), unobservable rm characteristics which positively a¤ect
the level of R&D investments are likely to be positively correlated with R&D subsidies.
To exclude this bias we have included rm-specic xed e¤ects in our regressions. Also,
since R&D subsidies are partly motivated by the belief that R&D investments might
be discriminated against in the capital markets, we have included the rmscash ow
as a proxy for liquidity constraints inuencing the level of investments9. According to
this, the regression equation is
Rit = 0 + 1Sit + 2S
2
it + 3CFit + 4R
G
it + t + i + eit (3.1)
where i is a rm index, t is a time index, Sit is sales, CFit, is cash ow before R&D
investments, t is a vector of time dummies, i is a vector of rm dummies to account
for xed e¤ects and eit is an error term. The coe¢ cient on subsidies, 4 =
@Rit
@RGit
; is the
parameter of primary interest.
Our sample covers 697 observations of business units at the three digit line of busi-
ness level in the high-tech industry dened as ISIC 382, 383 and 385 (the manufacture
of machinery, electrical equipment and technical instruments). These have been suc-
cessfully merged with the manufacturing statistics. There are at least two observations
of every business unit, and all business units have at least 20 employees on average
over time. The variables have been deated, and all observations are weighted by the
square root of inverse sales to correct for heteroscedasticity.
The theory does not say anything about functional form, and various specications
have been tried in the literature. A matching grants subsidy regime implies a linear
9We recognize that this cash ow variable could also be a proxy for investment opportunities.
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relationship between R&D investments and subsidies, whereas other studies, e.g. Bound
et al. (1984), suggest a loglinear relationship between R&D investments and sales.
We prefer a linear relationship since the e¤ect of subsidies is what we are primarily
interested in.
The results are given in Table 4, 5, 6 and 7. Column (1) reports a linear functional
form, estimated with xed e¤ects. We consider this to be our main regression. To
test the robustness of this specication, column (2) reports a linear functional form
estimated with the variables transformed to rst di¤erences between years t and t  2
and column (3) reports a loglog functional form estimated with xed e¤ects. The
general impression from the tables is that the three di¤erent specications agree on the
main e¤ects. We will base our discussion on the results in column (1) unless otherwise
is stated.
3.3.1. Main results
From Table 4 we see that 4 is 1.03 and highly signicant. This suggests that there is
no crowding out, but nor does there seem to be any degree of additionality either10.
The results of the questionnaire studies indicated that the e¤ect of subsidies may have
changed over time. In a set of regressions not reported, we have investigated this by
including a dummy for observations from the 1990s in interaction with the subsidy
variable. The results do not indicate that the e¤ect of R&D subsidies has changed. We
have also run regressions where the sample is extended to include all manufacturing
industries11, but the coe¢ cient is still stable, 4 then being 0.98.
With respect to the other variables, we see that sales squared has a signicantly
positive coe¢ cient, implying that both small and large rms are more R&D intensive
than medium size rms. This nding is supported by the empirical study of Bound et
al. (1984), but runs contrary to previous work on the relationship between size and
R&D cited in their article12. Finally, cash ow has a positive and signicant e¤ect on
10Since we have controlled for rm-specic e¤ects there must be a longitudinal positive correlation
between subsidies and private investments. Firm-specic e¤ects, however, do not completely exclude
reverse causality as an explanation for our results. As pointed out by Kauko (1996), applications
for nancial support are dependent on the rms intention to invest in R&D. If most applications
are accepted, R&D subsidies then contain information not only on the cost of R&D but also on the
intention to carry out new R&D projects. Hence, it is possible that there is a positive bias left even in
the xed e¤ects estimates. Kauko argues that this kind of endogeneity can be controlled for by using
data on applications led. This, however, is only true to the extent that the rms own evaluation
of the R&D-projects is not a¤ected by the outcome of the application. This may not be so, and in
any case, data on applications led are presently not available. We will, therefore, have to leave this
problem unresolved. Note, however, that in addition to the possible positive bias that Kauko points
at, there is also a possible negative bias due to measurement errors.
11This sample has 2141 observations, and is constructed in the same manner as the sample based on
high-tech industries alone. The results are not reported.
12 In the sample comprising all manufacturing industries, we nd a signicantly negative coe¢ cient
on sales squared, indicating that this relationship may vary across industries. Note however, that there
is an obvious selection problem associated with the sample. Førre (1997) doing a thorough analysis of
the size-R&D relationship in Norwegian manufacturing, concludes that the empirical relationship found
when correcting for selection bias by conventional methods, is quite sensitive to model specication
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R&D investments, suggesting that liquidity constraints may be relevant to the R&D
investment decision.
3.3.2. Di¤erences between small and large rms
In Table 5 we report regressions studying whether there are di¤erences between small
and large rms. We do this by including a dummy variable for small and large business
units in interaction with the subsidy and cash ow variables. We have dened small
business units as units with average employment below the 25th percent percentile, i.e.
below 58 workers. Large units are dened accordingly as those larger than the 75th
percent percentile, i.e. having an average employment above 263 workers, cf. Table 1.
In an interview study of Norwegian manufacturing rms, Hervik and Waagø (1997)
nd support for the hypothesis that large rms, having a portfolio of projects, will seek
to obtain public support for those projects they have already decided to undertake,
whereas small rms, being less diversied and possibly more liquidity constrained,
will nd subsidies with a matching grant claim to be a stimulus making increased
R&D investments possible. It is di¢ cult to nd support for this hypothesis in our
data. The only business units having some degree of additionality, approximately 25
percent, associated with R&D subsidies, are the large ones. For small units there
is neither crowding out, nor additionality, whereas for medium size units the point
estimate indicates about 50 percent crowding out. This nding might be rationalized
if we extend the hypothesis of Hervik and Waagø by taking account of monitoring
costs. It is probably di¢ cult for the governmental agencies to assess whether R&D
projects for which small and medium size rms apply, will be undertaken without
support. The hypothesis of Hervik and Waagø then explains why we nd crowding
out for medium size rms, but not for small rms. Large rms, however, are likely
to be monitored more closely by the government, as they receive large grants and are
well known regular customers. If these rms apply for projects which are obviously
protable without subsidies, the governmental agencies might see through it, and they
can even lose credibility with respect to future applications. This may explain why we
do not nd crowding out for these rms.
When it comes to cash ow, we see a similar pattern as both small and large business
units have a larger coe¢ cient than medium size units. These results are somewhat
surprising, however, and cast doubt on the cash ow variable being able to account for
liquidity constraints. Two problems may be of relevance. First, a number of small and
medium size business units are subsidiaries of larger rms, and the cash ow of such
units does not contain information about the nancial constraints they face. Second,
cash ow may be considered a proxy for present success of the rm and thereby for
expected future success. Expected future success increases the incentive to invest in
and outlying observations. There is a large international literature on the size-R&D relationship, cf.
Cohen and Klepper (1996), but a more detailed investigation of the question is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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R&D. It is, however, not clear why successshould stimulate R&D investments more
strongly in large than in small rms.
3.3.3. Di¤erences between the e¤ect of subsidies from various public sources
The R&D surveys have detailed information on R&D investments by source of nance,
and this makes it possible to investigate whether the e¤ect of R&D subsidies varies
across di¤erent public sources. The main governmental agencies awarding R&D sub-
sidies have traditionally been research councils, industry funds and ministries. Pure
subsidies have mostly been awarded through research councils. Grants from industry
funds are often subsidized loans, but still with an own risk capital claim. Grants from
ministries consist of various R&D contracts, many of which are defense related. We
believe that the demand for own risk capital tends to be weaker in these projects.
Table 6 reports the results of regressions with subsidies from the three main sources
included as separate variables. We see that there are no clear cut di¤erences between the
e¤ects of the various subsidies, but all regressions agree that subsidies from industry
funds have a coe¢ cient which is somewhat lower than the others. If the sample is
extended to include all manufacturing industries, the regression results suggest that
subsidies from research councils have a somewhat more positive e¤ect than subsidies
from the other two sources.13
3.3.4. Dynamic e¤ects
So far we have implicitly assumed that there are no dynamic e¤ects associated with
receiving R&D subsidies. As we will explain below, di¤erent models of accumulation of
knowledge have di¤erent predictions with respect to the dynamic e¤ects of R&D subsi-
dies. A very simple rst approach is to include lagged R&D subsidies in the regressions
above. The results are reported in Table 7. We see that R&D subsidies lagged two
years have a signicantly positive e¤ect in the xed e¤ects regression based on a linear
functional form. In column (2), using rst di¤erences, there is also a positive coe¢ -
cient, but it is not statistically signicant, while in column (3), the loglog specication,
there is a non-signicant negative coe¢ cient. When extending the sample to include
all manufacturing industries, the coe¢ cients in columns (1) and (2) increase both in
magnitude and signicance.14 The coe¢ cient in column (3), the loglog specication,
becomes essentially zero in the larger sample.15 This suggests that R&D subsidies are
likely to have a positive dynamic e¤ect, and we would like to point out explicitly the
lack of evidence for a negative e¤ect.16
13Not reported.
14The coe¢ cient in column (1) is then 0.58 and signicant at the 1 percent level.
15Testing for di¤erences between large and small rms, we nd that the positive dynamic e¤ect is
strongest for small rms. This positive small rm e¤ect can also be detected with a loglog specication.
16Further evidence for the existence of this e¤ect is given in Figure 2, explained in section 4.1.
9
SNF Working Paper No 33/10
Dynamic e¤ects of subsidies are obviously important for public policies, as they
may inuence the social return to subsidies. Positive dynamic e¤ects indicate that the
government permanently changes the rmsprot opportunities in favor of more R&D
intensive products by awarding temporary subsidies which induce the rms to increase
their R&D investment. A positive dynamic e¤ect, then, will increase the social return
to R&D subsidies if the level of commercial R&D is below its social optimum at the
outset.
4. Dynamic e¤ects of R&D subsidies: A theoretical analysis
In the rest of this paper we explore the dynamic e¤ects of R&D subsidies more thor-
oughly. We start out by discussing the predictions of conventional models of R&D
investments. Next we present an alternative structural model which we nd better
suited to explain the data. This alternative model captures the idea that rms which
have invested heavily in R&D in the past, and hence have a large knowledge capital,
will produce new knowledge more e¢ ciently than less experienced rms. In the last
part of the paper we attempt to estimate this structural model, before summing up our
main ndings.
4.1. The conventional R&D investment model
The most widely used specication for the accumulation of knowledge capital, K, is to
treat R&D the same way as physical capital i.e.
Kt = Kt 1 (1  ) +Rt: (4.1)
where  is the rate of depreciation, cf. Griliches (1979, 1995). As is well known, with
this specication, knowledge capital is adjusted so that
0(Kt) = w0t (r + ) wt+1 (4.2)
where 0(Kt) is the nominal marginal prot of knowledge capital, w0t is the marginal
cost of R&D, r is the discount rate and wt+1 is the change in the market price of
R&D.17 From equations (4.2) and (4.1) we can deduce some simple comparative statics
results. First, by totally di¤erentiating (4.2) and adopting the standard assumption of
a decreasing marginal product of knowledge capital, we have
dRt
dw0t
=
r + 
00
< 0 (4.3)
17The exact expression also includes the term wt+1 which will be close to zero.
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Furthermore, along an optimal investment path we have that
dRt+1
dw0t
=
dRt+1
dKt
 dKt
dRt
 dRt
dw0t
=   (1  )  1  r + 
00
> 0: (4.4)
Here dRt+1dKt is calculated by totally di¤erentiating equation (4.1) and setting dKt+1
equal to zero.
If rms are subsidized at the margin, the e¤ect on optimal R&D investments of a 50
percent subsidy can be quite dramatic, at least if the prot function is not too concave
in K. In particular, consider the case where an R&D subsidy in the form of a matching
grant disappears. A 50 percent increase in marginal R&D costs when the subsidy
disappears, should induce a signicant reduction in the optimal amount of knowledge
capital. Hence, it would be optimal to deinvest or at least not to continue investing
in knowledge capital when the R&D subsidy disappears for reasonable specications of
the prot function and the depreciation rate. In the Cobb-Douglas case, the reduction
in the optimal capital stock is 50 percent for a given level of output, if the R&D price
increases by 50 percent.
If rms are not able to decide the size of their subsidized project, i.e. if they are not
subsidized at the margin, Rt must be considered an exogenous variable unless the R&D
subsidies are completely crowded out. Given the results in section 3, this does not seem
to be the case. Keeping the assumption of a decreasing marginal product of knowledge
capital, and a constant market price of R&D, and then totally di¤erentiating equation
(4.2) in period t + 1; when writing Kt+1 as a function of Kt 1; Rt; and Rt+1 with Rt
as a function of w0t; we nd that
dRt+1
dRt
=   (1  ) < 0 (4.5)
Hence, whether or not rms are subsidized at the margin, R&D investments in period
t+ 1 will be reduced relative to period t in rms which lose their subsidies. This runs
contrary to the results reported in Table 7 where the e¤ect of lagged R&D, dRt+1dRt ; was
positive or at least not negative.
Further support for our claim that the predictions of the conventional model do
not t the data can be found in Figure 2, graphing the distribution of growth rates
in R&D investments from year t   2 to year t + 2 for business units which were not
subsidized in those years, but which received subsidies in the middle year, t.18 This
is the leftmost box-and-whisker plot and may be compared with the rightmost plot of
rms not subsidized at all.19 First note that there are no rms which stop investing in
18Growth is measured in percent of the average level of investments in year t  2 and year t+ 2.
19The box in the Box-and-Whisker plots extends from the 25th percentile (x25) to the 75th per-
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R&D when their R&D grant expires, and a large number of rms increase their R&D
investments relative to the pre-subsidy level. Average growth for the subsidized rms
is 11 percent, whereas average growth for the non-subsidized rms in the rightmost
distribution is -10%. From the gure we also see that median growth is higher for rms
which have received subsidies.20
We conclude from the empirical results that the standard, perpetual inventory
model for knowledge accumulation, equation (4.1), is too simple to serve as a basis
for a realistic model of R&D investment behavior. Let us now consider various modi-
cations of this model, before we turn to a more drastic respecication.
4.2. Modications of the conventional model: Rescue attempts
An obvious rst step in making the perpetual inventory model more realistic is to add
a non-negativity constraint to R&D investments such that R  0, i.e. one can not
deinvest by selling already acquired knowledge. The pattern of optimal investments in
this extended version of the model has been examined in some detail by Arrow (1968)
and others. Arrows analysis shows that the basic e¤ect of this extension for the case
with an expected rise in R&D costs, e.g. due to the elimination of R&D subsidies,
would be that the non-negativity constraint will tend to be binding somewhat earlier,
while the option of R&D subsidies still is in place. The intuition is that the rms
stop their R&D investment before the subsidy is removed in order to avoid the non-
negativity constraint being too costly. Clearly, this result does not make the behavior
predicted by the model more realistic, the e¤ect is rather to the contrary, given that
rms typically continue their R&D activity also after the R&D subsidy disappears, as
shown above.
A more promising suggestion would be to add convex adjustment costs similar to
the model used to derive Euler equations for physical capital investment as in Summers
(1981). This would make large changes in investment more costly and induce the rms
to adjust their level of R&D more slowly. Given a reasonable specication of the prot
function, the rms would like to reduce their R&D investments after the R&D subsidies
have been eliminated, and they will do it gradually. However, while we nd it natural
to think about adjustment costs for expanding the R&D activity rapidly, it is less clear
to us whether there are similar adjustment costs involved when downscaling an R&D
project making it optimal to do it gradually.
Finally, let us make a remark about another, less structural, model of R&D invest-
centile (x75), i.e. the interquartile range (IQ). The lines emerging from the box are the whiskers,
and extends to the upper and lower adjacent values. The upper adjacent value is dened as the largest
data point less than or equal to x75 + (1:5  IQ). The lower adjacent value is dened symmetrically.
Observed data points more extreme than the adjacent values are individually plotted.
20Unfortunately, the number of business units that have a pattern of subsidies which allows them to
be included in Figure 2 is very small, 13 in the leftmost distribution and 69 in the rightmost distribution.
The results are, however, robust towards extending the sample to include all manufacturing industries.
Doing this, the distributions consist of 29 and 234 business units respectivly.
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ments, the so-called error-correction model widely used in time-series econometrics.
This model also has the equilibrium condition (4.2) as its point of departure, but sug-
gests that the rms adjust to deviations from this condition with a lag and then only
gradually due to some unspecied adjustment costs. Our scepticism about what such
adjustment costs are really meant to represent does not need to be repeated; the issue
here is that a lagged response of, say, two years does not make much sense for the kind
of shocks we are considering. That a rm needs two years to realize or at least to react
to an anticipated increase in R&D costs after the grant period has expired, does not
seem very convincing.
To sum up, R&D investment models based on variations of the standard model
for knowledge accumulation predict that rms will reduce their own R&D investments
after an R&D grant has expired or somewhat earlier, possibly down to zero if a non-
negativity constraint on R&D is binding. Otherwise, they will rely on adjustment costs
that we do not nd convincing. These models do not seem appropriate as models of
R&D investment behavior, and we now turn to an alternative specication that will
induce the somewhat sluggish adjustments we observe in the data and which o¤ers a
specic explanation by emphasizing learning and feedback in R&D investments and
knowledge accumulation.
4.3. Modelling R&D investments with learning-by-doing
The following accumulation equation for knowledge has been suggested by Hall and
Hayashi (1989), Jones (1995), Lach and Rob (1996) and Klette (1996) among others:
Kt+1 = K
 
t R

t (4.6)
 is the scale elasticity in knowledge production and  is a parameter capturing the
productiveness of R&D in generating new knowledge21. Note that the multiplicative
relationship between Kt and Rt on the right hand side of (4.6) implies positive compli-
mentarity between new R&D investments and already acquired knowledge. This can
be thought of as representing learning-by-doing in R&D.
A rm operating from period t = 0 to t = T; and which wants to maximize its
present value, faces the following problem
max
R0;:::;RT
PV = f(K0)  w0R0 +
t=TX
t=1
t[(Kt)  wtRt]g (4.7)
subject to (4.6). (Kt) is the prot function,  is the discount factor, and wt is the
21The exact formulation is from Klette (1996). We recognize that (4.6) has the rather extreme and
unrealistic implication that a rm which stops its R&D in a single year will lose all its knowledge
capital. Alternative specications that avoid this problem tend to give more complicated estimating
equations that we do not explore in this study. However, as most rms have continous R&D activity,
we believe equation (4.6) can be thought of as a reasonable approximation.
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rms average unit cost of R&D. In order to simplify the model and derive comparative
static results, we make the following assumptions:
 T = 2
  = 1 (i.e. constant returns to scale in knowledge production.)
It is trivial to see that R2 = 0 must be part of an optimal R&D investments path as
the e¤ect of R2 does not materialize within the time period considered22. Given this,
the problem reduces to
max
R0;R1
PV =

[ (K0)  w0R0] +  [ (K1)  w1R1] + 2 (K2)
	
: (4.8)
The rst order conditions are
@PV
@R0
=  w00 + 0 (K1)

K0
R0
1 
+2 (1  )0 (K2)K(1 )
2
0 R
(1 ) 1
0 R

1 = 0 (4.9)
and
@PV
@R1
=  w01 + 20 (K2)

K1
R1
1 
= 0 (4.10)
This gives the following expressions for optimal R&D investments
R1 = K
1 
0 R

0

0 (K2)
w01
 1
1 
(4.11)
and
R0 = K0


w00
 1
1 
"
0 (K1) +  (1  )
 
0 (K2)
 1
1 


w01
 
1 
# 1
1 
(4.12)
We are particularly interested in the e¤ects of varying w0; the marginal cost of R&D.
The relevant derivatives are
@R1
@w01
< 0
@R0
@w00
< 0 (4.13)
@R1
@w00
Q 0 @R0
@w01
Q 0: (4.14)
The algebraic expressions are given in appendix B.
Consider now the e¤ect on R&D of a subsidy which makes investments in R&D
cheaper at the margin. The same period e¤ect is given in (4.13), and, not surprisingly,
we see that rms will increase their R&D activity when R&D is subsidized. In this
22For simplicity we have assumed that the rms knowledge capital cannot be sold in the market.
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respect, the model performs similarly to the traditional framework, cf. equation (4.3).
The dynamic e¤ects, however, are more interesting. From the leftward derivative in
(4.14) we see that a temporary subsidy at t = 0, may induce the rm to undertake
more R&D also in the next period even if it is not subsidized then. This contrasts
the conventional model of R&D investments, where the dynamic e¤ect is negative, cf.
equation (4.4). Note also that it is the diminishing returns to knowledge capital which
make (4.14) indeterminate. If we isolate the learning-by-doing feature of our model
by assuming that 0 (K) is constant23 and thereby that 00 (K) = 0; we see from the
expressions in appendix B that the pure e¤ect of learning is positive, i.e. @R1
@w00
< 0: The
existence of learning-by-doing in R&D is therefore able to explain the empirical results
in Table 7. From (4.14) we also see that a known subsidy at t = 1; may induce the rm
to increase its R&D activity already at t = 0: This is another result which is impossible
within the conventional framework built on the analogy between physical capital and
R&D. A rm which knows that capital will be subsidized at t = 1; and not at t = 0;
will denitely not increase its investments in the period when capital is not subsidized.
The intuition behind the dynamic behavior of our model is that when there is
learning-by-doing in R&D, increased R&D today will make rms more e¢ cient R&D
performers in future periods through their increased knowledge capital. This increases
the protability of future R&D. Likewise, if a rm gets to know that the price of R&D
will be lowered in the future, it will nd it protable to increase its present R&D, as
this will make it a more e¢ cient R&D performer in future periods when it will increase
its R&D activity due to the lower price.
Note that a subsidy regime which induces rms to increase their same-period R&D
without altering the marginal price will have the same dynamic e¤ects as
@R1
@R0
R 0 @R0
@R1
R 0 (4.15)
The rightmost result is derived by treating R1 as an exogenous variable and using
implicit derivation on (4.9). Once again, going to appendix B and setting 00 (K) = 0;
we nd a certain positive dynamic e¤ect.
5. A structural, econometric analysis of the dynamic e¤ects of R&D
subsidies
We now want to pursue a more complete structural modelling of R&D investments suit-
able for empirical applications, building on the framework of Klette (1996) and Klette
and Johansen (1998). First we present the model and extends it by incorporating
uncertainty in the knowledge production function, as uncertainty is an important char-
acteristic of R&D investments. Next we modify the model to handle R&D subsidies,
and derive the estimation equation.
23 In this case the optimal level of investment is not dened within the conventional framework.
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5.1. An empirical innite horizon model with uncertainty in knowledge pro-
duction
To incorporate uncertainty in the knowledge production function, rewrite (4.6)
Kt+1 = K
 
t R

t "t (5.1)
where "t is a mean-one stochastic factor accounting for the randomness in research
activities. One way to identify the optimal investment behavior given the accumulation
equation above is to consider the Bellman-equation
V (Kt) = max
Rt
ft (Kt)  wtRt + Et [V (Kt+1)]g
= max
Rt
ft (Kt)  wtRt + Et [t+1 (Kt+1)  wt+1Rt+1]
+2Et [V (Kt+2 )]g; (5.2)
where Kt+1 is as specied in (5.1). Et is the expectation operator, conditioned on the
rms information set available when it makes its decision about the investment Rt:
We can identify an optimal path by considering the marginal change in Rt+1 induced
by a marginal change in Rt such that an optimal path remains unchanged from period
t+ 2 onwards, i.e.
EtdKt+2 = Etd
h
(K t R

t "t)
 Rt+1"t+1
i
= Et

 (  ) Kt+2
Rt
dRt + 
Kt+2
Rt+1
dRt+1

= Et

Kt+2

(  ) dRt
Rt
+
dRt+1
Rt+1

= 0 (5.3)
implying that, in expectational terms,
dRt+1
dRt
=   (  ) Rt+1
Rt
: (5.4)
The rst order condition associated with (5.2), given that Kt+2 is xed is
wt =  Et

0t+1(Kt+1)
@Kt+1
@Rt
  wt+1dRt+1
dRt

(5.5)
which, using (5.1) and (5.4), can be restated as
wtRt =  Et [
0
t+1(Kt+1)Kt+1] + (  )Et [wt+1Rt+1]: (5.6)
A common specication of the prot function implies that 0t(Kt)Kt =  St, where
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St is sales (see Klette, 1996). Hence, an optimal R&D investment path requires that
wtRt =  Et [St+1] + (   )Et [wt+1Rt+1] (5.7)
The Euler equation (5.7) gives a tight relationship between R&D expenditures in period
t and expected sales and planned R&D expenditures in period t+ 1.
5.2. Incorporating matching grantsR&D subsidies in the empirical model
To incorporate public R&D-subsidies letRt = RPPt +R
PG
t +R
G
t . Based on the discussion
in section 2, we have three analytically interesting situations which imply di¤erent
modications to the Euler equation:
1. If there is full crowding out, we cannot distinguish between the R&D investments
of subsidized and non-subsidized rms, and the Euler equation does not change.
In this situation it is also obvious that the rms cannot be subsidized at the
margin.
2. If there is less than full crowding out, but not a signicant degree of additionality,
rms are not likely to be subsidized at the margin. The subsidies do, however,
increase the rmstotal R&D-investments. A situation where there is signicant
additionality, but where rms nonetheless are constrained with respect to the
size of the subsidized project, will have the same implications with respect to the
Euler equation. We will discuss these below.
3. If there is signicant additionality, and the rms are unconstrained with respect to
the size of the subsidized project, the marginal cost of R&D is given by equation
(2.3), with  = 1 as a limiting case implying that there is full additionality.
In the cases grouped under item 2 above, w0 is not a¤ected by the subsidy, hence
w0 = w: Furthermore, RG and RPG are exogenous to our analysis. In these cases,
introducing public R&D-subsidies induces two changes in the Bellmann equation (5.2),
and these are the replacement of R by RPP as the control variable and the replacement
of R by
 
RPP +RPG

inside the brace. The rst order condition (5.5), then becomes24
wt =  Et
"
0t+1(Kt+1)
@Kt+1
@RPPt
  wt+1
dRPPt+1
dRPPt
#
(5.8)
which can be rewritten
wtRt =  Et [
0
t+1(Kt+1)Kt+1] + (  )Et [wt+1Rt+1]: (5.9)
24We assume here that
dRPGt+1
dRPPt
= 0: In a more complete model where one endogenizes the allocation
of R&D subsidies, one would want to allow the amount of privately nanced R&D invested this year to
inuence the amount of subsidies received next year. Such a ne point, however, is beyond the scope
of this exposition.
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Note that this equation, maybe somewhat surprisingly, is identical to equation (5.6). As
long as a rm is not subsidized at the margin, therefore, its optimal R&D investment
path will follow (5.6), and hence (5.7), whether it receives subsidies or not. This,
however, is not to say that receiving subsidies is without implications for the rms
investment decision, something which can be seen by rewriting (5.7) specifying the
various components of Rt and Rt+1:
wt
 
RPPt +R
PG
t +R
G
t

=  Et [St+1]
+(   )Et [wt+1
 
RPPt+1 +R
PG
t+1 +R
G
t+1

] (5.10)
We see that a rm which does not receive subsidies at time t (when it decides RPPt ),
but which does expect to receive subsidies at time t+ 1, will undertake more R&D at
time t than a rm with the same expectations about sales, but which does not expect
to receive subsidies in the next period. There is a simple rationale for this: the rm
knows that it will receive some additional R&D resources in the next period which,
by assumption, cannot be completely crowded out. According to equation (5.1), these
resources can be utilized more e¢ ciently the higher its knowledge capital base, Kt+1;
at that time. Given this, it is optimal for the rm to preparefor the expected R&D-
expansion in advance by building up more knowledge through an increase in RPPt : Due
to the same dynamic e¤ect, a rm which receives subsidies at time t; but which does
not expect to receive subsidies at time t+1, will do more R&D at time t+1; than a rm
with the same expectations about sales, but which does not receive subsidies at time
t: This is because the subsidized rm starts out at time t+ 1 with a larger knowledge
capital base then the non-subsidized rm, something which makes it a more e¢ cient
knowledge producer. For this reason the subsidized rm nds it optimal to invest
more in R&D at time t+1 than it would have done without the subsidy at time t: This
will of course also increase its knowledge capital at time t+ 2; relative to the scenario
without a subsidy at time t; and consequently we can conclude that a temporary R&D
subsidy which is not completely crowded out, will have a lasting positive impact on the
rms future R&D investments. This e¤ect will of course be more signicant the less
crowding out or more additionality there is associated with the subsidy.
Let us now consider the case described under item 3 above, i.e. the case with
additionality and where the rms decide the size of the subsidized projects. In a period
where rms are subsidized, their marginal cost of R&D is given by equation (2.3). We
must then distinguish between three di¤erent situations;
 (i) the rms are subsidized at the margin at time t, but do not expect to be
subsidized at the margin at time t+ 1:
 (ii) the rms are not subsidized at the margin at time t, but expect to be subsi-
dized at the margin at time t+ 1:
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 (iii) the rms are subsidized at the margin at time t, and expect to be subsidized
at the margin at time t+ 1:
When the rms are not subsidized at the margin, their marginal cost of R&D is
w0 = w; and this makes it possible to easily incorporate a fourth category within the
framework that we are now building up. This category comprises all other rms, i.e.
 (iv) those rms which are not subsidized at the margin at time t, and which do
not expect to be subsidized at the margin at time t+ 1.
Using dummy variables to distinguish between rms in di¤erent situations, the
Euler equation (5.7), becomes
D2 +D4 + (D1 +D3)

1 + 

wtRt =  Et [St+1]
+(  )Et

D1 +D4 + (D2 +D3)

1 + 

wt+1Rt+1

(5.11)
where D1 is one for rms in category (i) and zero otherwise, D2 is one for rms in
category (ii) and zero otherwise, D3 is one for rms in category (iii) and zero other-
wise, and D4 is one for rms in category (iv) and zero otherwise. Given the application
and data collection procedure, cf. footnote 7, it seems likely that the rms are well
informed one year in advance about whether or not they will receive subsidies. Assum-
ing, therefore, perfect foresight with respect to next years subsidies, equation (5.11)
can be reformulated
wtRt =  Et [St+1] +


f(D1 +D3)  Et [St+1]g
+(   )Et [wt+1Rt+1]
+
(   )

fD1  Et [wt+1Rt+1]g
 (   )
1 + 
fD2  Et [wt+1Rt+1]g : (5.12)
Note that as  ! 0; some of the coe¢ cients go to innity, once again reecting the
fact that rms are not likely to be subsidized at the margin for such values of ;
and, thus, that there are not likely to be rms in category (i)-(iii) if  is low. Note
also that if some rms are misclassied as belonging to one of the categories (i)-(iii)
when belonging to category (iv), these observations still have all the relevant variables
included. They do, however, also have non-zero additional variables, namely those
involving dummies in (5.12). From an econometric point of view, this can be interpreted
as the inclusion of irrelevant variables, and the estimated coe¢ cients for these variables
should be insignicant and close to zero if in fact the majority of rms are not subsidized
at the margin.
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5.3. Estimating the Euler Equation
We start out by assuming that subsidized rms are subsidized at the margin. This
hypothesis can be tested. Equation (5.12) can be estimated and will, given the necessary
data, identify the degree of additionality through the parameter  if the hypothesis is
correct. If it is wrong, it will be falsied through non-signicant parameters for the
terms involving dummy variables.
The Norwegian R&D surveys contain information on planned R&D, Et [wt+1Rt+1],
but not on expected sales. To circumvent this problem, we have used real sales in the
following year as a proxy, and instrumented this variable by its present and lagged value
in order to avoid the endogeneity problem thus involved. The sales data are merged in
from the manufacturing statistics.
Another problem is to decide which rms belong to which of the four categories
determining the values of the dummy variables. Assuming perfect foresight one year
ahead is reasonable and helps, but we have annual R&D data only for the period 1982-
1985. For the period 1985-1995, the R&D surveys were only conducted every second
year, and, hence, for these years we do not know which rms received a subsidy in period
t + 1: One way to proceed, is to assume that rms received subsidies at time t + 1 if
they received subsidies both at time t and t + 2; as there is positive autocorrelation
in subsidy allocation. Likewise, therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that rms
did not receive subsidies at time t + 1 if they did not receive subsidies at time t nor
at time t+ 2 : Similar reasoning cannot be adopted for rms which received subsidies
at t, but not at time t + 2, or the other way around. These observations, therefore,
have to be excluded. Unfortunately, then, there are rather few observations in our
data set which can identify the coe¢ cients in front of the last two terms in equation
(5.12), as the majority of the observations are from the period 1985-1995, and it is
only a small fraction of the rms that change their subsidy recipient status in the years
1982-1985 . There are 17 observations in category (i), 13 observations in category (ii),
31 observations in category (iii) and 121 observations in category (iv). To correct for
heteroscedasticity, all observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales.
Further information about the variable construction can be found in appendix A.
The estimation results are given in Table 8. The coe¢ cients of equation (5.12) are
reported in column (1). Two of the dummy variable terms are statistically insignicant
and have opposite signs to those predicted by theory. The last one is correctly signed
and weakly signicant. Using the correctly signed and weakly signicant coe¢ cient to
identify  gives b = 7:45; a value way outside the theoretical range,  2 h0; 1i. This
means that this coe¢ cient is also too close to zero to have a meaningful interpretation.
We conclude from this that the hypothesis underlying the regression is wrong, i.e. that
rms are not subsidized at the margin. This view is also supported by our result of no
additionality in section 3.3, cf. the discussion at the very end of section 2.
If the subsidized rms are not subsidized at the margin, all rms will have to be
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reclassied to category (iv), and the dummy variable terms will not be part of the
regression equation. Table 8, column (2) reports the estimation results based on this
assumption. With this specication, both coe¢ cients are signicant at conventional
levels.
6. Conclusions and future research
Whereas many countries subsidize R&D in private companies through tax credits, subsi-
dies to the Norwegian high-tech industries have mainly been given as matching grants,
i.e. the subsidies are targeted, and the rms have to contribute a 50 percent own risk
capital to the projects. It is, however, an open question to what extent this induces
rms to increase their total R&D investments as they may reduce non-subsidized R&D
activities upon receiving an R&D grant. Our results suggest that grants do not crowd
out privately nanced R&D, but that subsidized rms do not increase their privately -
nanced R&D either. Hence, the own risk capital seems to be taken from ordinary R&D
budgets, and there is no additionalityassociated with matching grants subsidies.
Our results also suggest that the subsidies most e¢ ciently stimulate R&D invest-
ments in small and large rms as opposed to medium size rms. One hypothesis which
may explain this is that R&D investments in small rms are liquidity constrained,
whereas large rms are so closely monitored by the governmental agencies awarding
the subsidies that it is di¢ cult for them to receive support for projects which are prof-
itable without subsidies. A variable measuring the rmscash ow does not indicate
that small rms are liquidity constrained, however. This might be because this variable
rather measures the present success of the rms, something which may be considered
a proxy for future success and thereby for the incentive to invest in R&D. Our main
result of neither crowding out, nor additionality, seems to be robust both over time and
across a wider sample of manufacturing rms than those belonging to the traditional
high-tech industries. In addition, there are no clear cut di¤erences between the e¤ects
of subsidies awarded by research councils, industry funds and ministries.
We have also investigated possible long-run e¤ects of R&D subsidies, and we have
shown that the conventional perpetual inventory model of R&D investments predicts
the dynamic e¤ects of subsidies to be negative. There is, however, no empirical evidence
supporting this claim. On the contrary, there seems to be a positive dynamic e¤ect, i.e.
temporary R&D subsidies seem to stimulate rms to increase their R&D investments
even when the grants have expired. We have argued that learning-by-doing in R&D
activities is a possible explanation for this, and our theoretical analysis shows that
such e¤ects alter the predictions of the conventional models. The intuition behind the
dynamic behavior of our model is that with learning-by-doing in R&D, increased R&D
in one period makes rms more e¢ cient R&D performers in future periods through
increased knowledge capital. This increases the protability of future R&D.
A structural, econometric model of R&D investments incorporating such learning
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e¤ects has been estimated with reasonable results. These results suggest that matching
grants subsidies do not a¤ect the rmsmarginal price of R&D, a nding which is to
be expected if there is little or no additionality associated with subsidies in the period
in which they are awarded.
In future research, it is our ambition to combine the Euler equation in this paper
with the performance equation of Klette (1996), in order to identify the parameters
necessary to predict the strength of the dynamic e¤ects, and not least to estimate the
returns to private and public R&D investments.
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Appendix A: Data
The core of the high-tech industries is the manufacture of o¢ ce machinery and com-
munication equipment, i.e. ISIC 3825 and 3832. This is the kind of production most
intensely promoted by the government, but subsidies have been awarded to a wider set
of high-tech projects than those performed within these two sub-industries. To obtain
a sample of reasonable size, and to avoid classication problems associated with com-
panies having production and research activities covering a broader class of products
than ISIC 3825 and 3832, we have used production and R&D aggregated to the three-
digit line of business level. For the purpose of empirical analysis in this paper, we have
therefore dened high-tech as the manufacture of machinery, electrical equipment and
technical instruments, i.e. ISIC 382, 383 and 385. These industries have many R&D
performing rms and are technologically related.
Data sources
The analysis uses merged data from R&D surveys and time series les of the man-
ufacturing statistics. The manufacturing statistics of Statistics Norway is an annual
census of all plants in the Norwegian manufacturing industries. From this source we
use information on sales and cash ow. See Halvorsen et al. (1991) for documentation
of the data base. R&D surveys are available for the years 1982-85, 1987, 1989, 1991,
1993 and 1995. These surveys were carried out by the Royal Norwegian Council for
Scientic and Industrial Research (NTNF) until 1989 and by Statistics Norway from
1991. See Skorge et al. (1996) for denitions and industry level gures. We have aggre-
gated R&D expenditures to the three digit (ISIC) line of business level before merging
these variables to the manufacturing statistics. This means that our observations are
not rms, but business units. A business unit is dened as all production activities
within a rm having the same three digit ISIC classication. Single plant rms consist
of one business unit, whereas multiplant rms may consist of several business units.
Approximately 75 percent of all manufacturing rms are single plant rms.
Sample construction
The R&D surveys have close to full coverage of rms with more than 20 employees in
the industries studied, i.e. ISIC 382, 383 and 385. There are altogether 1658 time-year
observations of business units at the three-digit line of business level in these industries
included in the surveys. 1278 of these are successfully merged to the manufacturing
statistics. 714 observations had a time average of more than 20 employees, positive R&D
investments and were included in at least two surveys. This sample was moderately
trimmed leaving 697 observations for our empirical investigations. Outliers were dened
as rms having value added per man-hour below the one percent percentile, above the
99 percent percentile or having an R&D intensity above the 99 percent percentile. Table
23
SNF Working Paper No 33/10
1 gives some sample statistics.
Variable construction
Sales are measured as the value of gross production corrected for taxes and subsidies.
Cash Flow before R&D is measured as sales subtracted labor expenses, material ex-
penses and rentals. To this measure are added R&D expenses nanced by own means
as given in the R&D surveys. Nominal variables in the manufacturing statistics are
deated using industry level deators from the Norwegian national accounts. The R&D
variables include both intramural and extramural R&D expenditures. The R&D ex-
penditures, consisting mainly of labor costs, are deated using an index based on the
movement of average wage in ISIC 382, 383 and 385.
For the years 1982-1987, planned R&D is reported in man-years. When estimating
the Euler equation, this variable is converted to Norwegian kroner using the rm-specic
ratio between R&D man-years and R&D investments in the year of the survey, and in-
ated with the growth in the R&D price index during the following year. Another
weakness with the data for planned R&D is that they in 1995 include R&D-related
capital investments. To adjust for this, the variable is reduced by the 1995 share of
R&D-related capital investments in the sum of R&D and R&D-related capital invest-
ments.
There are also problems related to the instruments used in the Euler equation. We
do not have data for sales in 1996, and the 1995-observations therefore lack our proxy
for expected sales. To circumvent this, we have constructed the proxy using sales in
1995, if possible, multiplied by the rm-specic growth rate from 1994 to 1995. We
use a similar procedure for rms that exit the panel before 1995, and to construct the
instrumental variable, lagged sales, where this is missing.
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Appendix B: Algebraic expressions for the derivatives in section 4.3
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Figure 2: The change in R&D accompanying a Subsidy Regime change 
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Table 1: Sample Statistics 
 
ISIC 382, 383 and 385   
Total no. of observations 697 
     no. of business units 192 
     average no. of observations per business unit 3,6 
Observations with subsidies 300 
     subsidized from research councils 197 
     subsidized from industry funds 111 
     subsidized from ministries 98 
Observations of small business units (Average no. of workers<25th perc.) 176 
Observations of large business units (Average no. of workers>75th perc.) 168 
Average no. of workers per business unit 334 
     25th. Percentile 58 
     Median 107 
     75th. Percentile 263 
Average R&D intensity 0,07 
Median R&D intensity 0,04 
Average subsidy share (excluding observations with zero subsidy) 0,23 
Median subsidy share (excluding observations with zero subsidy) 0,17 
 
Sample: R&D performing business units in 1982-1995 included in at least two R&D surveys, having at least 20 workers on average, and 
being successfully merged with the manucaturing statistics. The sample is moderately trimmed.  See appendix A for further details. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Norwegian Interview Studies of the Crowding Out Effect of R&D Subsidies 
 
Study GF84 HB89 HBW92 HW97 OKOH97  
Sample size 54 191 213 200 49 Weighted 
Time periode 78-82 80-84 84-89 90-95 92-95 average 
Project done without subsidy 34 % 33 % 15 % 6 % 2 % 18 % 
Project delayed or diminished 46 % 45 % 46 % 57 % 28 % 48 % 
Project not done without subsidy 20 % 23 % 40 % 37 % 70 % 34 % 
 
Studies: GF84; Grønhaug and Fredriksen (1984), HB89; Hervik and Brunstad (1989), HBW92; Hervik, Berge and Wicksteed (1992), HW97; 
Hervik and Waagø (1997), OKOH97; Olsen et.al. (1997).  Respondents who could not or did not answer are not included.  
Only in HB89, where the full sample consisted of 230 projects, was this cathegory of any significance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation Coefficients Between Deviation From Planned R&D and Change in R&D-Subsidy 
 
  Corr.coef. Sign.level No. of obs. 
One year horizon: Planned R&D in man-years 0,006 0,95 107 
Two year horizon: Planned R&D in man-years 0,34 0,00 147 
Two year horizon: Planned R&D in kroner 0,17 0,10 99 
 
9 observations in 1991 where deviation from planned R&D measured in man-years and kroner has opposite signs are excluded.   
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Table 4: The Effect of R&D-Subsidies on Total R&D 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Functional form linear Linear loglog 
Estimation method fe Diff fe 
       
Sales -0,025** (0,0088) 0,0050 (0,0080) -0,62 (1,52) 
Sales squared 1,5e-8*** (4,7e-7) -2,9e-10 (5,0e-9) 0,020 (0,046) 
Total R&D-subsidy 1,03*** (0,16) 1,06*** (0,17) 0,064*** (0,012) 
Cash flow 0,087*** (0,025) 0,097*** (0,033) 0,019 (0,015) 
       
R-Square 0,95 0,39 0,90 
No. of observations 697 379 697 
 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales [log of sales in (3)] to correct for heteroscedasticity. Time dummies 
included in all regressions.  The variables have been deflated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  The Effect of R&D-Subsidies on Total R&D: Differences Between Small and Large Firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Functional form Linear linear Loglog 
Estimation method Fe diff Fe 
       
Sales -0,022*** (0,0084) 0,0076 (0,0074) -0,55 (1,50) 
Sales squared 1,3e-8*** (4,8e-9) -2,6e-9 (5,7e-9) 0,018 (0,046) 
Total R&D-subsidy 0,51* (0,27) 0,47** (0,22) 0,056*** (0,014) 
     *small firm dummy 0,48 (0,32) 0,63** (0,29) 0,022 (0,025) 
     *large firm dummy 0,74** (0,36) 0,74** (0,33) 0,012 (0,032) 
Cash Flow 0,041* (0,025) 0,034 (0,025) 0,0093 (0,019) 
     *small firm dummy 0,028 (0,055) 0,040 (0,059) 0,015 (0,032) 
     *large firm dummy 0,056 (0,039) 0,077* (0,047) 0,017 (0,038) 
       
R-Square 0,95 0,41 0,90 
No. of observations 697 379 697 
 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales [log of sales in (3)] to correct for heteroscedasticity. Time dummies are 
included in all regressions. The variables have been deflated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Large and small firms are defined as 
firms with average employment below the 25th percetile and above the 75th percentile respectively. 
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Table 6:  The Effect of R&D-Subsidies on Total R&D: Differences Between Sources of Subsidies 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Functional form Linear linear Loglog 
Estimation method Fe diff Fe 
       
Sales -0,024*** (0,0087) 0,0050 (0,0080) -0,58 (1,57) 
Sales squared 1,4e-8*** (4,8e-9) -4,8e-10 (5,0e-9) 0,020 (0,048) 
Subsidy from research councils 0,95*** (0,23) 1,57*** (0,59) 0,043*** (0,012) 
Subsidy from industry funds 0,72*** (0,29) 0,97*** (0,26) 0,029*** (0,011) 
R&D grants from ministries 1,17*** (0,25) 1,07*** (0,24) 0,053*** (0,016) 
Cash flow 0,085*** (0,024) 0,098*** (0,033) 0,020 (0,015) 
       
R-Square 0,95 0,39 0,89 
No. of observations 697 379 697 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales [log of sales in (3)] to correct for heteroscedasticity.  
Time dummies are included in all regressions. The variables have been deflated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  The Effect of R&D-Subsidies on Total R&D: Dynamics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Functional form linear linear loglog 
Estimation method fe Diff fe 
       
Sales -0,020** (0,019) -0,0058 (0,013) 3,38 (3,35) 
Sales squared 1,2e-8*** (1,1e-8) 4,4e-9 (9,0e-9) -0,099 (0,10) 
Total R&D-subsidy 1,15*** (0,24) 0,96*** (0,32) 0,051*** (0,020) 
Total R&D-subsidy at t-2 0,36* (0,20) 0,16 (0,15) -0,019 (0,016) 
Cash flow 0,083** (0,037) 0,087** (0,035) 0,038 (0,024) 
       
R-Square 0,96 0,29 0,91 
No. of observations 379 181 379 
 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales [log of sales in (3)] to correct for heteroscedasticity. Time dummies are 
included in all regressions. The variables have been deflated. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 8: Euler Equation Estimates 
 
 (1) (2) 
     
Expected sales 0,0023* (0,0013) 0,0033** (0,0016) 
     * dummy for subsidy only at time t or both at t and t+1 (D1+D3) -0,0020 (0,0029)   
Planned R&D 0,82*** (0,017) 0,090*** (0,031) 
     * dummy for subsidy only at time t (D1) -0,22 (0,17)   
     * dummy for subsidy only at time t+1 (D2) -0,097* (0,051)   
     
Root MSE 5,7 13,6 
No. of observations 182 528 
 
The observations are weighted by the square root of inverse sales to correct for heteroscedasticity. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
2SLS regression on nominal values.  Sales at period t+1 is used as proxy for expected sales and instrumented with sales in period t and t-1. 
*     Significant at the 10% level 
**   Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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